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Abstract
Finding an optimal key assignment (subject to given constraints) for a key predistribution scheme
in wireless sensor networks is a difficult task. Hence, most of the practical schemes are based on
probabilistic key assignment, which leads to sub-optimal schemes requiring key storage linear in
the total number of nodes. A graph theoretic framework is introduced to study the fundamental
tradeoffs between key storage, average key path length (directly related to the battery consumption)
and resilience (to compromised nodes) of key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks.
Based on the proposed framework, a lower bound on key storage is derived for a given average key
path length. An upper bound on the compromising probability is also given. This framework also
leads to the design of key assignment schemes with a storage complexity of the same order as the
lower bound.
keywords: key pre-distribution; sensor networks; graph theory; graph diameter; de Bruijn graph
1 Introduction
A sensor network is made up of low-cost nodes operating on battery power. Hence, computation and
energy consumption are major constraints for the design of sensor networks [3]. Similar to key distribu-
tion schemes with an online trusted third party server [23, 24], the main design goal of key management
in a sensor network is for entity authentication or initial trust establishment, that is, to allow the sensor
nodes to identify each other or to distinguish between insiders and outsiders (adversarial nodes) during
deployment.
Since the nodes in a sensor network usually belong to the same owner, it is thus fairly reasonable to
assume all the nodes have prior contact with a common entity or server before deployment; nevertheless,
using an online server as in [23, 24] is considered as impractical for sensor networks. As a result, to
∗An earlier version of this paper appeared in the proceeding of ICST WiOpt’09.
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minimize the consumption of resources like computation and energy in order to fulfill the low cost
constraint, key predistribution schemes (introduced in [19, 22]) have emerged as the de facto method for
achieving initial trust in a sensor network despite that a considerable among of key storage is usually
needed [1, 2, 4, 10–13, 16–18]. Note that the family of probabilistic key predistribution schemes [4, 10,
11, 13, 17, 18] requires key storage which is a linear function of the number of nodes in the network. In
other words, storage is traded off for reduced computation and longer battery lifetime. Although this
initial trust also provides private channels among sensor nodes to establish session keys for secret and
authenticated communication, entity authentication is still the main goal of key predistribution schemes
(KPS) for any sensor network.
In KPS, each node is preloaded with some set of secret keys into its key ring before deployment and
it is assumed that only the owner or nodes belonging to the same owner would know any of these keys.
Of course, a compromised node would also know part of these keys; so it is one of the design criteria
of KPS to minimize the impact of a compromised key ring. When two nodes find they share one or
more common keys, they will recognize each other as belonging to the same owner and thus trust each
other. Note that this trust is mutual in the sense that when node A trusts node B, node B should also
trust node A. This trust could also be called a keying relationship between A and B as in [21]. When two
nodes, A and B, share no common key, they cannot identify each other immediately, but if both of them
possess established trust with a third node C, of course through shared keys again, they can establish
trust through C and set up a new key between them to be used as a sign of trust afterwards. We call the
path A-C-B an authentication or acquaintance chain between A and B. Although misleading, this trust
establishment process is commonly known as path key establishment in the context of sensor network
key management since [13]. It is straightforward to see how this trust establishment can be extended
to a longer acquaintance chain, for instance, A-C-D-E-. . .- B. This is analogous to the authentication
chain [6,15] in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [8], but they differ in that the trust of the certificate chain
in PKI is unidirectional while the trust relationship between two nodes connected by an acquaintance
chain in KPS is mutual; in PKI, when A trusts that a public key belongs to B through some authentication
path in PKI, it is not necessary that B would trust the authenticity of A’s public key.
With this background, we could consider the design objective of any KPS for a sensor network as
finding a key assignment method allowing any two sensor nodes to authenticate each other through a
reasonable-length authentication chain with reasonable resource consumption, key storage requirement
and security, dependant on the application scenarios. Various design variations could be came up with
by varying the tradeoff between any pair of the desired properties or parameters of a KPS, including key
storage requirement, network connectivity, energy consumption, resilience to dead nodes and security
against compromised nodes.
When discussing entity authentication, it is natural to represent the keying or trust relationships
between nodes by a graph, just like the certificate graph in PKI [6, 21]. We call this type of graph a
trust graph (t-graph). In a t-graph G, the sensor nodes are represented as vertices in G and an edge
exists between two vertices only if the corresponding sensor nodes have direct established trust (i.e. they
share some common keys). The t-graph is indeed used in many existing schemes on sensor network
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key management [4, 13] to represent the keying relationships between nodes. However, the existing
work merely uses a t-graph for representation purposes to calculate the probability of connectivity of
the actual network. We especially study the tradeoff between storage and energy consumption for full
connectivity. They have overlooked the power of a t-graph as a bridge between the design and analysis of
sensor network key management and the result-rich graph theory. In this paper, we show how a t-graph
can be leveraged to demonstrate the tradeoff between the properties of KPS for sensor networks, unify
the existing schemes under this framework, and give design insight based on graph theoretic results,
in particular those about graph diameters and intersection graphs. We also give a lower bound on key
storage based on the proposed framework. This lower bound is generic in the sense that it applies to all
key predistribution schemes and the graph model in this paper is merely a means to derive this lower
bound but poses no restriction on the key assignment in the actual KPS.
The main contribution of this paper is the graph theoretical framework proposed to study key assign-
ment methods for key predistribution in wireless sensor networks. Such a realization provides a unifying
view for predistribution schemes and allows the derivation of key storage lower bound and compromising
probability upper bound for a given constraint on the average key path length (which is directly related
to energy consumption for bootstrapping a sensor network). The proposed framework also links results
in graph theory to the design of key assignment schemes. Through such link, we provide a number of
near optimal key assignment methods.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The definition of a t-graph is given in the next section
together with a discussion of the physical connectivity graph of a sensor network. Then, it will be shown
how the properties or parameter of a KPS is related to the parameters of a t-graph in Section 3. In
Section 4, the tradeoff between these parameters is discussed. After that, a number of near-optimal key
assignment methods are given in Section 5.
2 Trust Graph
In a t-graph or the associated key graph (which can be used to represent any KPS), each node in a sensor
network is represented as a vertex. In rigorous definitions, there are two main differences between a
t-graph and its key graph. First, each edge in a t-graph represents established trust between the two end
vertices while each edge in a key graph represents a key shared by the end vertices. Hence, multiple
edges between two adjacent vertices are possible in a key graph but not in a t-graph since two sensor
nodes may share more than one key but the trust relationship is binary (that is, two sensor nodes could
mutually trust each other or not). Second, a t-graph is an unlabeled graph while the edges of a key graph
are labeled by keys or key indices. The definitions of a t-graph and its key graph are given below.
Definition 1 [t-Graph] Given a set of sensor nodes S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, a t-graph G is an unlabeled,
non-weighted graph with a vertex set V (G) = S such that (si, sj) ∈ E(G) (the edge set of G) where
i 6= j if and only if si and sj have direct established trust, that is, share some common keys.
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Definition 2 [Key Graph] Given a set of sensor nodes S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} and a key set K =
{k1, k2, . . . , kt}, a key graph G is an edge-labeled or edge-colored, non-weighted graph with a ver-
tex set V (G) = S , a label set equal to K (or [1, t]) and an edge set E(G) ⊆ S × S × K such that
(si, sj , kr) ∈ E(G) where i 6= j if and only if si and sj share a common key kr .
It should be noted that si is just some kind of label for a sensor node and it could be of any format,
not merely the identity of a sensor node. If we label a sensor node by the set of keys it holds, the resulting
t-graph is an intersection graph [20].1
For the sake of clarity, in this paper, we consider a simple key assignment wherein each edge in a t-
graph is associated with a key. That is, the key graph can simply be obtained from a t-graph by assigning
key labels to it. Consequently, the problem of designing optimal key assignments reduces to finding an
optimal t-graph (with desired tradeoffs) for a given application scenario, and then assigning keys to links
in the t-graph.
The degree of a node in a t-graph, more precisely, the total number of key labels of all the edges
ending at a node in a key graph, tells the required key storage of that node. Nevertheless, in most
cases, the degree of a node in the t-graph gives a good indication of the key storage requirement. In any
proper KPS, both the t-graph and key graph should be connected, that is, any vertex in the graph should
be reachable by another. As usual, the distance between any two vertices, denoted by d(si, sj), is the
number of edges/hops traversed by the shortest path between si and sj . If two nodes are not connected,
the corresponding distance is ∞, which normally should not happen in a proper KPS. Suppose a t-graph
G has n vertices, the mean distance d and the diameter D of G are defined as follows:
d = 1
(n2)
∑
si,sj∈V (G)
d(si, sj),
D = maxsi,sj∈V (G) d(si, sj).
The mean distance and diameter are explicitly discussed here because they are related to the length
of the acquaintance chains in a particular t-graph, which are in turn related to the energy consumption
of establishing trust indirectly between two nodes through an acquaintance chain. The details will be
discussed in Section 3.
2.1 Physical Connectivity and Deployed t-Graph
Recall that KPS aims at allowing physical neighboring nodes (within the radio range of each other) to
identify each other and establish trusted links. If the actual deployment topology is known, we just need
to make a t-graph the same as the physical connection topology of the sensor network. The physical
connection could be best represented by a physical connectivity graph (or physical graph for short) in
which sensors are represented by vertices and an edge exists between two vertices if and only if they are
within the radio range of each other. A physical graph is the actual physical topology of a sensor network
in deployment. In other words, an edge in the physical graph represents that the two end nodes of the
1It has been shown that each graph is an intersection graph [20]. An explicitly vertex-labeled intersection graph is meant
here.
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Figure 1: Obtaining a deployed t-graph (representing the trusted links that can be established after boot-
strap) from the original t-graph (representing the established trust relationships among sensor nodes) and
a physical graph (representing the physical link connectivity in the actual deployed network).
edge are within reach of each other’s radio range and communicate directly without relying on others to
relay messages.
We should distinguish a t-graph or key graph from a physical graph of a sensor network; while an
edge in the latter represents a real physical link between two neighboring sensor nodes, an edge in a t-
graph (key graph) is just a logical link. In order to set up or boot-strap a secure network, only physically
neighboring nodes (connected by an edge in the physical graph) having mutual trust (represented by an
edge in the t-graph) can establish a trusted link. That is, even though two nodes are neighbors in the
t-graph, the bootstrapped initial trust between them would not be useful if they are not neighbors in the
physical graph. On the hand, two neighboring nodes within the radio range of each other still cannot
authenticate or verify the identity of the neighbor if they share no initial secret. If we want to see how
many trusted links are established in the actual network or equivalently how many edges in the t-graph
are effective for setting up trusted links in the actual network, we could obtain a deployed t-graph by
computing the graph-intersection of the t-graph and the physical graph. In a deployed t-graph, only
edges actually used to set up trusted links in the network are shown. However, an edge in the physical
graph not overlapped with an edge in the t-graph is shown as a dashed line, called a virtual edge. A
virtual edge corresponds to a physical link between two sensor nodes in physical proximity having no
mutual trust. Depicted in Figure 1 shows how a deployed t-graph can be obtained by overlapping the
original t-graph with a physical graph.
Additional trusted links can be established from these virtual edges as the nodes in question could au-
thenticate each other through an acquaintance chain, thus adding edges to the deployed t-graph. The pro-
cedure is as follows: Suppose si and sj (in physical proximity) wish to authenticate each other through
an acquaintance chain si−sa−sb−sj . Note that each neighboring pairs in this chain need to be physical
neighbors with established trust. si randomly picks a key k, encrypts k using the key it shares with sa,
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and passes it to sa. Then sa retrieves k and encrypts it using the key it shares with sb and passes it to sb.
This process continues until sj is reached. Finally, sj picks another key k′ and encrypts it using k and
sends it back to si. The key k′ or a combination of k and k′ would be used as a sign of trust established
indirectly between si and sj . The last step is necessary for key confirmation. This process in essence
converts virtual edges into trusted link in the deployed t-graph. How many successful conversion can be
made depends on the acceptable maximum length of the acquaintance chain. If there is no restriction on
this length, for a network with proper key assignment, all virtual edges or physical links can be turned
into trusted links.
The goal of any KPS for a sensor network is to convert as many virtual edges as possible into real
edges in the deployed t-graph subject to resource constraints like energy consumption (which poses
constraints on the maximum length of the acquaintance chain). The energy consumption cost of adding
one such edge would depends on the length of the acquaintance chain which is related to the mean
distance and the diameter of the deployed t-graph. Note that for any pair of nodes, the actual acquaintance
chain in the deployed network is likely to be different from that in the original t-graph, and only nodes
connected by a multi-hop path in the deployed t-graph could identify each other through an acquaintance
chain.
It should be noted that a virtual edge is not an authenticated link and one of its ends could possibly
be a pre-deployed adversary node. If we insist on using these virtual edges as channels to relay messages
for indirect trust establishment, a shorter physical path for the acquaintance chain is possible but the
reliability of this physical path is in doubt. Even worse is a long acquaintance chain including just
one untrusted edge would render the whole chain insecure, that is, the two end nodes of the chain are
unsuccessful in verifying the identity of each other. Hence, this approach is feasible only for scenarios
requiring a low level of security on entity authentication.2
Since some of the sensor nodes may die before or during deployment, the resulting physical graph
and thus the deployed t-graph could have a smaller number of vertices than that in the original t-graph.
Similarly, it is impossible to achieve perfect connectivity in the physical graph due to limited radio range
of each sensor node; consequently, the number of edges in the immediate deployed t-graph could be sig-
nificantly less than that in the original t-graph. These two phenomena are equivalent to deleting vertices
and edges respectively in the original t-graph to obtain the deployed one, causing disconnection of two
originally connected vertices. These events of disconnection lead to an increase in the diameter and mean
distance of the deployed t-graph compared to the original t-graph, and if a significant number of them
occur, the deployed graph could become disconnected even though the original t-graph is connected. The
length of the acquaintance chain between any two non-neighboring vertices increases accordingly. For
instance, the two virtual edges shown in Figure. 1 need a 3-hop chain to authenticate each other whereas
in the original t-graph a 2-hop chain exists. As a result, node degrees in a t-graph (and key storage re-
quirement as a consequence) needs to be significantly higher than the number of physical neighbors in
the actual network in order to tolerate edge and vertex deletion as the physical topology and the resulting
2In these scenarios, the number of sensor nodes is usually insignificant and key storage is thus not a serious constraint. As
a result, this approach may not have any application.
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physical graph are unknown prior to deployment in most cases.
2.2 Physical Connectivity Model
As can be seen in the last section, any KPS design needs to suit a particular physical connectivity model.
If the physical connectivity of the actual deployment is known, the t-graph for optimal key assignment
is simply the given physical connectivity graph. This paper considers the random graph model in which
each node has on average b neighbors (including both dead and living nodes) and a fraction pdie of
nodes die before deployment. The resulting physical graph has n(1 − pdie) vertices on average and the
probability that an edge exists between a pair of nodes is given by
plink = (1− pdie)2 b
n− 1 .
It can be shown that, in this kind of physical connectivity model, the parameters (like average node degree
and average distance) of the resulting deployed trust graph differs from that of the original t-graph by
a constant factor where the constant is function of plink only. As a result, for the sake of clarity, our
discussions in this paper will be mainly based on the t-graph rather than the actual deployed t-graph.
3 Relations between KPS Parameters and the Properties of t-graph
This section shows how the KPS design parameters are related to the properties and parameters of the
t-graph. In the following discussion, a t-graph is denoted by GT , its key graph by GK , the deployed
t-graph by GDT , and a physical graph by GP . To distinguish the parameters of a t-graph from that in
a key graph or a deployed t-graph/key graph, the parameters are attached with a subscript of T , K or
DT/DK respectively. For example, the diameters of a t-graph and a deployed t-graph are denoted by
DT and DDT respectively in the following discussion.
3.1 Storage
The key storage requirement l(si) of a node si is equal to the total number of different key labels on all
the edges (or equivalently the total number of edges) ending at that node in the key graph GK . Similarly,
the total number of keys used by the network L is equal to the total number of different key labels on all
the edges of the key graph.
l(si) = |
⋃
sj ,∃(si,sj ,kr)∈GK
{kr}|,
L = |⋃si,sj,∃(si,sj,kr)∈GK{kr}|.
If we consider a simple key assignment method in which each edge in the t-graph is assigned a single
distinct key, the storage at a node si is simply l(si) = deg(si) (node degree of si) and the total number
of keys is L = E(GT ).
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3.2 Connectivity
We consider the connectivity of the deployed t-graph GDT obtained by overlapping a t-graph GT with a
physical graph GP . The probability pc that any two nodes, say, si and sj , are connected by an edge in
GDT is given by:
pc = p(si, sj)
= Pr[{(si, sj) ∈ E(GP )} ∧ {(si, sj) ∈ E(GT )}]
= plink
|E(GT )|
(n2)
= (1− pdie)2 bn−1
1
2
P
si∈V (GT )
deg(si)
1
2
n(n−1)
= (1− pdie)2 bn−1
P
si∈V (GT )
deg(si)
n(n−1)
Note that pc in the deployed trust graph and its counterpart in the original t-graph differ by a factor
of plink as mentioned in the last section. Suppose the minimum and maximum degrees of GT are de-
noted by θmin and θmax respectively. Since nθmin ≤
∑
si∈V (GT )
deg(si) ≤ nθmax, we have the edge
connectivity probability pc given by
(1− pdie)2 bθmin
(n − 1)2 ≤ pc ≤ (1− pdie)
2 bθmax
(n− 1)2 .
This edge connectivity probability determines whether the deployed t-graph remains connected. As
a rough estimate, the required minimum degree of the original t-graph could be determined using plink,
which is summarized as below.
Theorem 1 To ensure that the deployed t-graph is connected (with reasonably high probability) for a
given plink, the minimum degree of the original t-graph GT is (1− plink)|E(GT )|+ 1.
Proof The probability that an edge in GT is deleted is given by (1− plink), then the expected number
of edges deleted from GT is given by a = (1 − plink)|E(GT )|. To ensure that the deployed graph is
connected after deleting a edges, GT must be a + 1 edge-connected, thus implying a minimum degree
of a+ 1.
A more accurate estimate for the required degree could be determined using the Erdo¨s and Re´nyi
random graph [25], but such an extension will not be discussed in this paper.
3.3 Energy Consumption
Suppose two nodes si, sj (connected by a virtual edge in the deployed t-graph) establish a new edge
through an acquaintance chain, the energy consumption is given by
W (si, sj) = dDT (si, sj) + 1
where dDT (si, sj) is the distance between si and sj in the deployed t-graph. Note that this equation also
applies to neighboring nodes with dDT (si, sj) = 1. Overall, the maximum energy consumption Wmax
over all node pairs is equal to the diameter of the deployed t-graph, that is,
Wmax = DDT + 1
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Recall that GP is the physical graph and we wish to establish trusted links on all edges of GP . The
average energy consumption per node pair W is given by
W = 1 +
1
|E(GP )|
∑
(si,sj)∈E(GP )
dDT (si, sj).
The above energy consumption indices have a unit of average energy per 1-hop transmission and
are expressed in terms of the diameter and distances in the deployed t-graph after vertices and edges are
deleted from the original t-graph; they do not help in the design of KPS for a sensor network in which we
can only control the diameter and distances in the original t-graph. In fact, without the knowledge of the
connectivity of the original t-graph, there is not much we can tell about the diameter or distance increase
in the deployed t-graph. For general t-graphs, the following theorems by Chung et. al. [5] could be
helpful.3 Nevertheless, without knowledge of the original t-graph, the bound about deletion of vertices
does not do any better than the loose bound DDT ≤ (n(1 − pdie) − 1). However, if we assume the
fraction of dead nodes is negligible, the bound about edge deletion could be useful.
Theorem 2 Diameter Increase After Edge Deletion [5]. For a t + 1 edge-connected graph G with
diameter D(G) where t ≥ 1, if t edges are deleted from G, the resulting graph G′ has the following
diameter upper bound:
D(G′) ≤ (t+ 1)D(G) + t
Theorem 3 Diameter Increase After Vertex Deletion [5]. For a λ vertex-connected graph G having n
vertices with diameter D(G), for t < λ, if t vertices are deleted from G, the resulting graph G′ has the
following diameter upper bound:
D(G′) ≤ ⌊n− t− 2
λ− t ⌋+ 1
Although it is almost impossible to find a nice upper bound on the diameter DDT and average dis-
tance dDT of a deployed t-graph GDT obtained from any general t-graph, in the following, we will
characterize a t-graph with its node degrees, diameter and mean distance, and the minimum number of
disjoint paths between any pair of non-adjacent vertices with a view to obtaining some bounds for the
energy consumption indices. The result is given by the following claim:
Theorem 4 Suppose a t-graph GT with n vertices, diameter DT , average distance dT and minimum
degree θmin, and each pair of vertices in GT have at least f disjoint shortest-path acquaintance chains.
Given the diameter DDT of the resulting deployed t-graph GDT (obtained by overlapping with a physical
graph), the average distance dDT of GDT taken over all physical neighbors is bounded above by the
following:
dDT ≤ dT + (DDT − 2)
(
1− θmin
n− 1
)
· P
3A t edge-connected graph is a connected graph such that if less than t edges are removed, the graph remains connected.
Similarly, a t vertex-connected graph is a connected graph such that is less than t vertices are removed, the graph remains
connected.
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where P =
[
1− (1− pdie)DT−1
(
b
n−1
)DT ]f
.
Proof Suppose we pick two node si and sj which are physical neighbors. Let their distance in GT
be d′ = d(si, sj) ≤ DT . Assume there are f ′ ≥ f disjoint path of this length. There are d′ edges and
(d′ − 1) vertices between si and sj in GT .
Pr[1 path remains connected in GDT ] = (1− pdie)d′−1
(
b
n−1
)d′
Pr[All f ′ paths are disconnected in GDT ] =
[
1− (1− pdie)d′−1
(
b
n−1
)d′]f ′
≤
[
1− (1− pdie)DT−1
(
b
n−1
)DT ]f
The probability of disconnection between si and sj is:
pdc = Pr[si, sj are not neighbors in GT and all f ′ paths are disconnected]
≤
(
1− θmin
n−1
)[
1− (1− pdie)DT−1
(
b
n−1
)DT ]f
.
Note that d′ ≥ 2 and the new distance between si, sj should be at most DDT (diameter). Therefore the
distance increase is given by ∆d(si, sj) ≤ DDT − 2.
Since whether two nodes are physical neighbors are randomly picked, we could take the mean dis-
tance dT in GT as the mean distance of the subset of pairs connected by physical links. As a result, the
new mean distance dDT in GDT is given by:
dDT = dT +
1
|E(GP )|
∑
si,sj,∃(si,sj)∈E(GP )
pdc∆d(si, sj).
This concludes the proof.
Depending on the scenario in question, we could use the bound in Chung’s theorem (Theorem 2)
or the very loose bound n(1 − pdie) − 1 to substitute DDT in this equation. Note also that the average
energy consumption W is given by
W ≤ 1 + dT + (DDT − 2)
(
1− θmin
n− 1
)
×
[
1− (1− pdie)DT−1
(
b
n− 1
)DT ]f
.
From this equation, we can easily see that as the mean distance dT or diameter DT of the original PR
graph drops, the average energy consumption W drops, and as the minimum number f of disjoint paths
or the minimum degree θmin of the original graph increases, the average energy consumption decreases
(which is expected). If Chung’s theorem is used, for DT = 2, there is almost a linear relationship
between W and vertex degree θ of a regular graph in which θmax = θmin = θ.
Although the connectivity discussed is Section 3.2 can be considered as a special instance of neigh-
borhood connectivity with h = 1, we should distinguish between the two as the former refers to the
whether a t-graph remains connected after edges and vertices are deleted from it due to limited radio
range and dead nodes in the actual deployment, and without the energy consumption constraint, all
edges in a physical graph could be connected.
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4 Storage Lower Bound
Without loss of generality, we could assume that each edge in a t-graph is assigned a unique, distinct key,
and as a result, the degree of a vertex in the t-graph is the key storage requirement at it. The following
theorems relate the diameter and mean distance of a t-graph with its node degree. This also states the
storage lower bound for any key predistribution scheme for a given key path length that can be tolerated.
These lower bounds apply to all key predistribution schemes and demonstrate the trade-off between
storage and energy consumption for trust establishments in a sensor network.
The following two theorems give the minimum initial secret key storage needed for bootstrapping a
sensor network subject to a certain maximum length restriction on the acquaintance chain.
Theorem 5 Given a t-graph GT having n vertices with diameter DT , for the maximum node degree
θmax > 2, the following holds:
θmax ≥ 1 + DT
√
n
Proof Randomly pick a node si, there are at most θmax nodes 1-hop away. At 2 hops away, there are
at most θmax(θmax − 1). At i hops away, there are at most θmax(θmax − 1)i−1. Hence, the total number
of nodes within DT hops away from si is given by:
1 + θmax + θmax(θmax − 1) + . . .+ θmax(θmax − 1)DT−1.
Since any two nodes in GT should be no more that DT hops apart, the above number should be greater
than n, that is,
n ≤ 1 + θmax + θmax(θmax − 1) + . . .+ θmax(θmax − 1)DT−1
= 1 + θmax[(θmax−1)
DT −1]
(θmax−1)−1
= θmax−2+θmax(θmax−1)
DT −θmax
θmax−2
= θmax(θmax−1)
DT −2
θmax−2
< θmax(θmax−1)
DT
θmax
(assuming θmax > 2)
= (θmax − 1)DT .
As a result, θmax ≥ 1 + DT
√
n.
We can derive the storage lower bound easily and is stated as follows.
Theorem 6 For a maximum acceptable key path length D, the minimum key storage θmin(n,D) needed
at each node for a sensor network with n nodes is given by:
θmin(n,D) ≥ 1 + D
√
n.
In order to achieve resiliency against dead nodes and links which happen right after the sensor net-
work is deployed, additional key storage provision is usually needed to allow alternative choices for the
acquaintance chain between any two sensor nodes. Doing a similar analysis, we can arrive at the follow-
ing corollary for a t-graph wherein any pair of non-adjacent vertices are connected by at least f disjoint
paths.
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Corollary 7 Given a t-graph GT having n vertices with diameter DT and there are at least f disjoint
paths between any two non-adjacent vertices, for the maximum node degree θmax > 2, the following
holds:
θmax ≥ 1 + DT
√
fn
The above theorem in essence tells us that if we want to ensure that any two sensor nodes could
authenticate each other through another node, we need at least a square root storage (with respect to the
total number of nodes) at each sensor node. If we could tolerate a longer acquaintance chain, say 3 hops,
we only need a cube-root storage per node. Node that this discussion does not take into account of the
deleted edges or vertices in the actual sensor network, but combined with the results of the last section
and the following theorem on average distance, we can determine the minimum θmax needed to meet a
given W constraint.
Theorem 8 Given a t-graph GT having n vertices with diameter DT , maximum degree θmax > 2 and
minimum degree θmin > 2, the following holds for the mean distance dT :
dL < dT < dU
where dL = DT − θmax(n−1)(θmax−2)2 (θmax − 1)DT
and dU = DT − 1(n−1)(θmin−2) [(θmin − 1)DT − (DT + 1)].
Proof Suppose we first consider a regular graph with node degree θ and diameter D. Picking any node
si, the number of nodes at 1 hop away is θ, at i hops away is θ(θ − 1)i−1. We could take the number of
nodes at D hops away to be (n− 1) minus the sum of all these. The mean distance d(θ) for this regular
graph could be computed as follows:
(n− 1)d(θ) = 1 · θ + 2 · θ(θ − 1) + . . . + (D − 1) · θ(θ − 1)D−2
+D · [(n− 1)− (θ + θ(θ − 1) + . . .+ θ(θ − 1)D−2)]
= θ
θ−1
∑D−1
i=1 i(θ − 1)i−1 + (n− 1)D − θθ−1
∑D−1
i=1 (θ − 1)i
= D(n− 1) + θ
θ−1
(D−1)(θ−1)D+1−D(θ−1)D+(θ−1)
(θ−2)2
−D θ
θ−1
(θ−1)D−1
(θ−2)
.
.
.
= D(n− 1)− θ
(θ−1)(θ−2)2
[(θ − 1)D+1 − (D + 1)(θ − 1) +D]
So, we have
d(θ) = D − θ · [(θ − 1)
D+1 − (D + 1)(θ − 1) +D]
(n− 1)(θ − 1)(θ − 2)2 .
For a general graph, the mean distance dT should be smaller than d(θmin). That is,
dT ≤ DT − θmin[(θmin−1)
DT +1−(DT+1)(θmin−1)+DT ]
(n−1)(θmin−1)(θmin−2)2
< DT − θmin[(θmin−1)
DT +1−(DT+1)(θmin−1)]
(n−1)(θmin−1)(θmin−2)2
= DT − θmin[(θmin−1)
DT −(DT+1)]
(n−1)(θmin−2)2
< DT − [(θmin−1)
DT −(DT+1)]
(n−1)(θmin−2)
.
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Similarly, dT > d(θmax), and we have
dT ≥ DT − θmax[(θmax−1)
DT +1−(DT+1)(θmax−1)+DT ]
(n−1)(θmax−1)(θmax−2)2
> DT − θmax(n−1)(θmax−1)(θmax−2)2 (θmax − 1)DT+1
= DT − θmax(n−1)(θmax−2)2 (θmax − 1)DT .
This concludes the proof.
4.1 An Upper Bound on the Probability of Compromise
We have not considered trading off security for reduced storage in the discussion so far. When a node
is compromised, its keys would not leak out any other keys held by other users except the indirectly
established keys through this compromised node and the nodes in question could always establish another
indirect key through an alternative acquaintance path.
In order to reduce key storage, we could repeat the usage of the keys, say, the a key of a user is shared
with a multiple of its neighbors in the t-graph up to a maximum g. We could view the key assignment by
a labeled or colored t-graph of key graph such that each distinct label or color corresponds to a key. In
the case of repeated key usage, a color would appear more than once in the colored t-graph. Hence, when
a key is compromised, all edges in the graph with the same label or color would be affected and cannot
be used. The following theorem bounds the number of links affected when a node is compromised.
Theorem 9 Given a t-graph on n vertices with maximum and minimum vertex degree θmax and θmin
and diameter D. Suppose each node in a sensor network uses a single key for at most g times. The
fraction pcompromise of links affected is bounded by the following:
pcompromise <
g
g − 2
θmax
nθmin
[(g − 1)D − 1]
Proof When a node is compromised, at most θmax neighbors are affected and each of which affects at
most (g − 1) neighbors. Hence, the total number of nodes affected is bounded by:
n′ = θmax + θmax(g − 1) + θmax(g − 1)2 + . . .+ θmax(g − 1)D−1
= θmax[(g−1)
D−1]
g−2 .
There are at most g edges in each of them are affected. As a result, the maximum number of edges
affected is given by n
′g
2 . The total number of edges in a t-graph is at least
nθmin
2 . As edges and vertices
are randomly deleted, we can therefore take this as the fraction n
′g
nθmin
over a t-graph as that in the actual
network.
Note that Theorem 9 can be easily extended for multiple compromised nodes. A straightforward but
less tight bound can be obtained by adding a multiplicative constant.
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5 Optimal Trust Graph Constructions
To design an optimal key assignment for a given sensor network scenario, we usually need to construct
a t-graph of n vertices with minimum vertex degree subject to the following constraints:
• a given diameter D;
• a given minimum number of paths between two non-adjacent vertices f .
5.1 Construction 1: Heuristic Approach
To construct such a graph, we could use a naive heuristic approach as follows: We start with a complete
graph Kn on all the n vertices. For each edge in Kn, delete it and check whether the constraints are still
fulfilled. If yes, update the graph, otherwise add back the edge.
5.2 Construction 2: de Bruijn Graph
If we just consider f = 1, we could use the de Bruijn graph family [9, 26] and their variations which
have very simple and nice structure.
The basic construction consists of the vertex set {(a1, a2, . . . , ap, . . . , ar) : ap ∈ [1, q]}, with
(a1, a2, . . . , ap, . . . , ar) adjacent to (a2, . . . , ap, . . . , ar, b) for any b ∈ [1, q]. Since the de Bruijn graph
is well known, there are various methods to construct it for different number of vertices [7, 14].
Such a graph has degree θ = 2q and diameter D = r on n = qr vertices. Note that θ = 2 D
√
n which
is just about two times of the lower bound given by Theorem 5.
5.3 Construction 3: A variation of de Bruijn Graph
If we do not insist on any value of f , the following variation for f > 1 could be used. Again, the vertex
set is {(a1, a2, . . . , ap, . . . , ar) : ap ∈ [1, q]} but q has to be prime. Randomly pick u > r vectors from
Z
r
q, say b1,b2, . . . ,bu, such that any r of these u vectors form a basis of Zrq. A vertex a is made adjacent
to a+ xbi, for all x ∈ Z∗q and 1 ≤ i ≤ u.
Such a graph has degree θ = u(q − 1) and diameter D = r on n = qr vertices and any pair of
nodes are connected by u!(u−r)! paths and u disjoint paths. Note that θ ≈ f D
√
n. The reason for this is as
follows:
Given any pair of vertices a1 and a2, the difference a1 − a2 could always be expressed as a lin-
ear combination of any r vectors from {b1,b2, . . . ,bu}. Suppose we pick r of them and call them
c1, c2, . . . , cr . Then, a1 = a2 + x1c1 + x2c2 + . . . + xrcr for some x1, x2, . . . , xr . Note that a1 is
adjacent to a1 + x1c1, which in turn is adjacent to a1 + x1c1 + x2c2 and so on. In other words, a2 is
reachable from a1 in at most r hops. Hence, the diameter D = r. Since there are r! ways in traversing
these r vertices and
(
u
r
)
possible combinations of these r vertices, we have the total number of paths is(
u
r
)
r! = u!(u−r)! .
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6 Conclusions
We apply graph theory to study key assignment methods for key predistribution in wireless sensor net-
works. We map the parameters of a key predistribution scheme with that of a t-graph, which represent
the trust relationships between sensor nodes. We give a storage lower bound and an upper bound on
compromising probability of key predistribution schemes with a given design constraint of maximum
acceptable key path length. We also show a number of near optimal construction from graph theory. We
believe better constructions can result via the proposed framework.
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